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In this report, Fox and Liscow argue that while
conventional wisdom holds that we should lower taxes on
corporations because of international competition, two
recent changes militate in favor of higher corporate taxes,
which would close the deficit, fund social programs, and
reduce inequality. First, changes in tax law have
increasingly targeted the corporate tax at economic
“rents,” the supersized returns that businesses receive
when they enjoy advantages like market power. Because
taxing rents is progressive and does little to harm
economic activity, a higher rate is justified. Second, shifts
in the American economy have allowed companies to earn
more economic rents, increasing the revenue a tax on rents
could raise — and increasing the appeal of the tax as a
deterrent to harmful behavior like lobbying government
officials to get or maintain market power. Although the
authors cannot say exactly what the corporate rate should
be, principally because the international dimension
remains so important, they offer reasons to favor a higher
rate and describe reforms that could help ease the
adoption of higher, but still efficient, taxes on corporate
returns. Fox and Liscow suggest that, at a minimum,
proponents of lower corporate tax rates present an
incomplete picture and that the “lower corporate tax
rates” conclusion is a non-obvious one.
Copyright 2020 Edward Fox and
Zachary Liscow.
All rights reserved.

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, JUNE 22, 2020

V.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Case for Higher Corporate
Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Corporate Tax Has Become More
Efficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Rising Rents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Other Reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Potential Drawbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. International Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Domestic Taxation Issues . . . . . . . . .
What to Do?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. International Avoidance . . . . . . . . . .
B. Refining the Focus on Economic
Rents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. What Rate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2021
2024
2024
2028
2030
2031
2031
2032
2034
2034
2036
2036
2037

I. Introduction
Many commentators have claimed that
increased international tax competition means
that the United States should have lower
corporate tax rates.1 As a result, while tax scholars
were broadly critical of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act,
most were sympathetic to the perceived need to
lower the corporate tax rate, reflected in the
TCJA’s reduction of the rate from 35 percent to 21

1

See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry, “The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the
Corporate Income Tax Rates,” 18 Chap. L. Rev. 19 (2014); Eric Toder and
Alan D. Viard, “Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues With a Mark-ToMarket Tax on Shareholder Income,” 69 Nat’l Tax J. 701 (2016) (arguing
for cutting corporate tax rates because “the current U.S. system for taxing
income earned within corporations has failed to adjust in response to
recent changes in the U.S. and global economy and in other countries’ tax
policies”); and Erica York, “The Benefits of Cutting the Corporate Income
Tax Rate,” Tax Foundation (Aug. 14, 2018).
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percent. The preponderance of voices in favor of
lower rates is likely compounded by skepticism
among many that a corporate-level tax makes any
3
sense at all.
We argue, by contrast, that too little attention
has been paid to factors that favor higher rather
than lower rates. Some of the reasons favoring
higher rates are long-standing, but others, which
we focus on here, result from structural changes
in the American economy and the corporate tax
itself over recent decades.
Our case for higher corporate tax rates goes as
4
follows: Entity-level taxes, like the corporate tax,
are well suited to target the supersized returns
that accrue to capital owners when their
companies enjoy market power or other nonreproducible advantages. Hitting these
supernormal returns — usually known as
“economic rents” — is a sweet spot because taxing
5
them is likely to be both economically efficient
and distributionally progressive.
Two big changes mean that corporate taxes
increasingly target rents, militating in favor of
higher rates. First, shifts in the legal structure of
the corporate tax, alongside subtler changes in the
composition of American business investment
over the past few decades, have focused the
existing corporate tax on economic rents. In
particular, the U.S. corporate tax has come over
time to resemble a cash flow tax, under which all
business investments can be immediately
deducted from taxable income, in contrast to the
historical norm in which investments could be

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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deducted only gradually over time. Immediate
deductions are appealing to businesses because
they would rather reduce their taxes today than in
the future. These changes have been criticized as
corporate giveaways by progressives,7 but we
instead celebrate them for making the tax more
efficient and thereby allowing higher rates.
In particular, economic theory implies that a
cash flow tax raises considerable revenue by
taxing economic rents at the statutory rate
8
without discouraging efficient investments. The
reason is that, for investments without rents, the
subsidy implicit in deductions at the time of
investment essentially nets out with the taxes on
income from the investment, resulting in a net tax
rate of zero. Because the tax rate is zero, investors
will make all the investments in projects without
rents that they would make if there were no taxes.
This in turn means that investors will still make
even more appealing investments — those with
rents — even though the government collects
substantial tax revenue from those rents. Modest
additional reforms could conform the corporate
tax even more closely to a cash flow tax. These
reforms include providing a more generous
treatment of tax losses as well as structures and
inventory, while ending the forgiving treatment of
9
interest under the current code. These changes
would further sharpen the corporate tax’s focus
on economic rents and make higher rates less
distortive.
Second, a variety of empirical work suggests
that economic rents play an increasing role in the

2

Section 11. Not all commentators supported dropping the corporate
rate all the way down to 21 percent, but most tax scholars who
commented on the appropriate rate called for cutting the rate below the
prevailing 35 percent rate. For example, Kimberly A. Clausing, Edward
D. Kleinbard, and Thornton Matheson — whom we think it is fair to
categorize as optimists on the possibilities of taxing capital — proposed
cutting the rate to 28 percent. Clausing, Kleinbard, and Matheson, “U.S.
Corporate Income Tax Reform and Its Spillovers,” IMF Working Paper
No. 16/127 (2016).
3

See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Abolish the Corporate Income Tax,”
The New York Times, Jan. 5, 2014.
4

Although we are focused on corporate taxes, our argument extends
at least as strongly to passthrough businesses. Section III discusses some
of the issues that would arise from applying a higher-rate regime only to
businesses taxed as corporations (C corporations).
5

We use the term “efficiency” in keeping with its economic
definition. Absent market failures, an efficient tax causes relatively little
unnecessary distortion to economic incentives. That is, efficient taxes
generate little behavioral response relative to a world with no taxes and
thus do not discourage the activities — like investment, savings, and
effort at work — that generate wealth.

2022

6

See infra Section II.A.

7

Howard Gleckman, “Dave Camp’s Great Bonus Depreciation FlipFlop,” Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (May 29, 2014) (criticizing
failures to repeal bonus depreciation and characterizing bonus
depreciation as a corporate windfall); and Steve Wamhoff and Richard
Phillips, “The Failure of Expensing and Other Depreciation Tax Breaks,”
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2018) (similar).
8

The idea of using a cash flow or economically equivalent tax at the
corporate level has long enjoyed some support in the public finance
community. Indeed, cash-flow-equivalent taxation has occasionally been
tried in practice — in Italy and Belgium, for example. But it has gained
new importance in recent years with more scholars taking up the
argument in favor of converting the corporate tax to a cash flow or
equivalent tax. See, e.g., proposals in Alan J. Auerbach et al.,
“International Tax Planning Under the Destination-Based Cash Flow
Tax,” 7 Nat’l Tax J. 783 (2017); Clausing, Kleinbard, and Matheson, supra
note 2; and Kleinbard, “The Right Tax at the Right Time,” 21 Fla. Tax Rev.
208 (2017).
9

See infra Section IV.B.
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American economy, partly because of growing
market power.10 The rise in economic rents is
therefore another reason to look again at the
potential of the corporate tax. Properly
structured, this tax can both efficiently raise
revenue and combat behaviors — like lobbying
governments to get or maintain economic
dominance — that can give rise to rents in the first
place and cause their own ill effects.
These arguments help answer a major
question in taxation — why we should have
corporate-level taxes (or, more precisely, taxes on
business entities, to which these arguments
11
equally apply ) at all, beyond administrative
12
convenience. These taxes make it feasible to tax
economic rents accruing to capital at higher rates
than the ordinary returns to capital (or labor
13
income). As a matter of both equity and
efficiency, this entity-level tax is likely to be
desirable. Taxing rents likely distorts economic
activity less than taxing labor income or the
ordinary returns to capital, and thus efficiency
counsels taxing rents at higher rates. Likewise,
taxing rents likely has very progressive
distributional effects.
Moreover, a corporate tax could raise
significant additional revenue with higher rates.
We estimate below that the government would be
levying from a huge tax base — at least $900
billion per year — even after further focusing the
tax on rents.

10

See infra notes 38-42 and surrounding text.

11

Because of the design complications of integrating the taxation of
corporate and noncorporate entities, we set the issue of integration aside.
See, e.g., Treasury, “Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax
Systems” (Jan. 1992) (explaining options for integration). Moreover, to
the extent that many integration proposals try to tax the normal return to
capital at the same rate as economic rents, this seems like a downside to
us.
12

See, e.g., James Mirrlees et al., Tax By Design (2011) (explaining that
the corporate income tax is administratively convenient because it (1) is
easier than taxing individual shareholders on corporate income entirely
at the personal level; (2) prevents individuals from incorporating
themselves to avoid personal tax indefinitely; and (3) allows an indirect
tax to be placed on tax-exempt (charities) or practically tax-exempt
shareholders (foreign shareholders under many treaties).
13

Personal-level taxes on corporate income (dividends and gains on
sales of stock) in this scheme provide an opportunity to tax the normal
return to capital, as well as tax economic rents a second time. We are not
concerned about taxing economic rents twice, as long as the cumulative
rate is appropriate. We discuss this point in greater detail later. But see
Kleinbard, “The Right Tax at the Right Time,” supra note 8 (discussing
the rise of rents and a rent tax, but ultimately concluding that the rise in
rents does not call for a higher tax rate on rents than other corporate
income).
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Our argument for higher rates is not a slamdunk, however. After we make our prima facie
case for higher rates, we review the arguments
favoring lower rates and discuss problems with
cash flow taxation in the real world, as well as
how these problems might be ameliorated. The
most prominent factor favoring lower rates is the
international mobility of profits, business activity,
and corporate residency. However, given the brief
length of this report, we mostly put this essential
issue to the side, because it has been extensively
14
discussed elsewhere. Instead, our argument is an
important, but partial, counterbalance to the
debate, which has overwhelmingly focused on
international mobility. And, in considering the
relative importance of domestic considerations, it
is important to keep in mind how much revenue
the corporate tax can raise despite these
international concerns. Even with international
mobility and a 35 percent rate that exceeded that
of much of the world, the U.S. corporate tax still
raised more than $300 billion annually before the
15
TCJA came into effect.
Although we don’t present an unblemished
case for higher rates, the question of the right
corporate tax rate remains critically important.
This is especially true given the widespread desire
among Democrats to repeal the TCJA; any such
repeal requires taking a position on what the new
16
rate should be. Even under the new 21 percent
rate, the corporate tax raised more than $200
billion of revenue last year, with the potential to
17
raise much more. And let’s state the obvious
here: We need the money if it can be raised
efficiently and fairly. Even before COVID-19 hit,

14

See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., Rachel R. Griffith, and Peter B.
Sorensen, “International Capital Taxation,” in Dimensions of Tax Design:
The Mirrlees Review 914 (2010) (providing a comprehensive review of the
international dimensions of taxing capital); Michael P. Devereux and
Griffith, “Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions,” 10 Int’l Tax &
Pub. Fin. 107 (2003); and Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of
Corporate Inversions” (Sept. 2017).
15

See Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, “Amount of Revenue by
Source” (Feb. 12, 2020) (taking an average of the five years before
passage of the TCJA).
16

For example, Joe Biden proposes a 28 percent rate. Richard Rubin,
“Joe Biden Proposes $1 Trillion in New Corporate Taxes,” The Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 4, 2019. Natasha Sarin and Lawrence Summers propose a 25
percent rate. Sarin and Summers, “A Broader Tax Base That Closes
Loopholes Would Raise More Money Than Plans by Ocasio-Cortez and
Warren,” Boston Globe, Mar. 28, 2019.
17

CBO, “Budget and Economic Data: Historical Budget Data” (Jan.
2020).
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the United States was running a deficit of about $1
trillion per year, which is projected to increase in
18
the medium and long run. Of course, there are
strong reasons to not raise taxes during a severe
recession, but — once the most urgent period is
over — higher corporate taxes could be offset by
lower taxes elsewhere or, if needed, pay back
some of the borrowing undertaken to combat the
recession spurred by COVID-19. Moreover, there
remain many worthy investments the
government could make that remain unfunded.19
Our goal in this report is to provide
policymakers trying to make Americans better off
with a missing piece of the puzzle: There are good
reasons for having higher corporate rates. We are
not wedded to a conclusion about the right rate,
but rather to the idea that the arguments favoring
lower rates (and dominating the current
discussion) are incomplete. Instead, we also need
to grapple with the factors that have changed in
favor of higher rates.
II. The Case for Higher Corporate Taxes
Two important but overlooked changes favor
higher corporate tax rates. First, changes in the
structure of the corporate tax, reinforced by
changes in the nature of business investment,
have made the tax more efficient. Second,
evidence suggests that there has been a significant
rise in economic rents, which are nondistortionary (and, indeed, perhaps beneficial) to
tax.
A. Corporate Tax Has Become More Efficient
The prima facie case in favor of raising
revenue through high capital taxes at the entity
level is straightforward if the tax is levied through
a cash flow tax. Under a cash flow tax, businesses
can immediately deduct the costs of purchasing
long-lived assets, like equipment and structures.
Under a standard “income tax” (a term of art
here), in contrast, these expenses would need to
be capitalized and thus deducted only over time
as they depreciate in value. Taxpayers, of course,
prefer immediate deductions to capitalized

18

CBO, “Budget” (Jan. 2020).

19

See, e.g., Nathaniel Hendren and Ben Sprung-Keyser, “A Unified
Welfare Analysis of Government Policies” (working paper, 2019).
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expenses because they can reduce their tax
liability sooner.
For a risk-free investment, companies receive
two types of returns. The first is the normal
return. The normal return is the premium that
savers demand in exchange for forgoing current
consumption and instead allowing their savings
to be used for investment. Thus, the normal return
is the amount that a company must pay to obtain
capital from savers to fund its investments. The
second is the “supernormal” return to capital, also
known as economic rents. Economic rents are
payments to a factor of production that exceed the
return necessary to induce the contribution of that
factor. This factor could be labor, land, or capital,
but here we’re concerned with capital. For
example, if a company borrows $100 to invest,
paying a 3 percent interest rate, and it gets returns
of $110 the next year, its rents are $7: It pays back
the $100 loan and the $3 of interest, and has $7 of
rents to spare. And a result that will be crucial
going forward is that, if the rent had been only $6,
or $1, or 1 cent, the company would still have
made the investment, since it still comes out
ahead after paying the interest.
We have long known that cash flow taxes
levied on business entities exempt the normal
return to capital from taxation.20 With a cash flow
tax, the government effectively becomes an equity
partner in the venture, giving the company part of
the capital it needs upfront in exchange for a share
of the future profits (through taxes). The cost to
the government of providing that capital is the
opportunity cost of forgoing other investment
21
opportunities, which is the normal rate of return.
If the normal return is all that the government
recovers when it taxes the profits, then it’s really
just getting paid back exactly what it provided,
and the company is effectively untaxed. And
(putting aside market failures) untaxed
companies produce efficient amounts of
investment. Thus, by exempting this normal

20

E. Cary Brown, “Business-Income Taxation and Investment
Incentives,” in Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of
Alvin E. Hansen (1948); Alvin C. Warren Jr., “How Much Capital Income
Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?” 52 Tax
L. Rev. 1 (1996).
21

Alternatively, one can think of the government financing its share
of the investment in the company by borrowing in the market at the
normal rate.
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return to capital, a cash flow tax leaves companies
investing the efficient amount, even at high rates.
Importantly, however, if the company earns rents,
a cash flow tax still hits those rents at the statutory
rates.
An example, summarized in the table, may
clarify things. Take a company that has $300 of
taxable income when the corporate tax rate is 40
percent. If the company does nothing else, it’ll
owe $120 in taxes ($300 * 40 percent). Under a cash
flow tax, if the company invests $100 in Project A,
it can take an immediate $100 deduction, leaving
it now with $200 of taxable income and $80 of tax
owed. Note that nothing would change
economically if the government collected the full
$120 tax originally owed and then mailed the
business a $40 check labeled “Government
22
investment in Project A.” Thus, the company has
to put up only 60 percent of the cost of the project,
with the government putting up the other 40
percent. In return, however, the government
collects 40 percent of any returns from the project,
just like an equity investor.23 So, as shown in
column (i), if Project A lasts one year and earns the
normal return (3 percent), that means it’ll be
worth $103 at the close of the project, with the
company owing the government $41.20 ($103 * 40
percent). The government put up $40 and got
$41.20 back — which might sound good for the
government and bad for the company — but
effectively, the government didn’t raise any tax.
This is easiest to see by imagining the government
borrowed the $40 at a 3 percent interest rate at the
outset to fund the “check” it sent. At the end of the
year, it has $41.20 and owes its lenders $41.20 ($40
+ $40 * 3 percent). As a result, the company is
effectively untaxed on projects earning the
normal return.
However, if Project A also earns rents, the
story is different, as shown in column (ii).
Suppose that the project yields $110. The
government now collects $44 ($110 * 40 percent),
leaving the government with $2.80 after paying

22

We later discuss the issues that arise if the company has losses. See
infra notes 69, 70, and 99 and surrounding text.
23

Note that the government’s equity stake is determined by the tax
rate. If the rate is 10 percent, the government puts up 10 percent of the
capital and takes 10 percent of the profits. Likewise, if the rate is 60
percent, it puts up 60 percent of the capital and takes 60 percent of the
profits.
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off its lenders. Notice that this is 40 percent of the
$7 of rents earned by the company.
Example of Cashflow Taxation of
Projects Without and With Rents
(i) Without
Rents

(ii) With
Rents

(1) Cost of Project A

-$100

-$100

(2) Change in tax
collected
Row (1) * 40% tax rate

-$40

-$40

$103

$110

$0

$7

(5) Value in year 2 of
year 1 tax reduction
Row (2) * 1.03 (because
of 3% interest rate)

-$41.20

-$41.20

(6) Change in year 2
tax collected
Row (3) * 40% tax rate

$41.20

$44.00

Year 1:

Year 2:
(3) Return on
investment
(4) Rent
Total:

Effective government tax collection
Row (5) + Row (6)

$0.00

$2.80

Thus, for projects that earn rents, becoming a
full equity partner is valuable to the government:
It raises a tax on the economic rents (here at a 40
percent rate). The government earns enough to
cover the costs of its initial investment and
captures some of the project’s upside, which takes
the form of rents. Importantly, however, the
government raises the money without
discouraging companies from making any
efficient investments. Recall that a company
already engages in the efficient level of
investment, as long as it gets back the normal
return. Everything beyond that is just gravy, and
taxing it won’t distort the company’s incentives.
A tax that raises revenue only from economic
rents is extremely attractive. A true rent is such a
good return that investors will choose to invest in
it even with a very high tax rate. As a result, these
returns are not sensitive to marginal tax rates.
Because a normal return is sufficient to induce an
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investor to invest, the loss of any return above that
(the rent) will not discourage the investment.
Thus, a tax that hits only these excess returns is
extremely efficient — indeed, as efficient as a
lump sum head tax24 — and thus, under some
assumptions, will have an optimal rate of nearly
100 percent. That is, a cash flow tax on rents is a
way of raising revenue essentially without
economic costs — a remarkable result, the
complications of which we return to later.
Thus far, we have considered a project with a
known return. But these results stay the same
when projects are risky. Savers demand higher
returns for investing in projects whose risk cannot
be diversified away. In the same way that the
government can invest in a risk-free venture, it
can also invest in a risky venture. It just has a
higher opportunity cost when it picks the risky
venture because the government could also invest
in another higher-risk, higher-return opportunity.
So only the rents are not part of the cost to the
government of investing, and thus are a return
above and beyond what it cost the government to
25
invest in the first place.
Recent changes in tax law and investment
patterns have brought business taxes closer to the
cash flow tax ideal. First, regarding changes in tax
law, in 13 of the 15 years before the TCJA, the code
offered bonus depreciation, allowing companies
to immediately deduct a large proportion of the
cost of purchasing long-lived equipment.26 The

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

SPECIAL REPORT
27

TCJA goes further, allowing the immediate
deduction of the full costs of purchasing
28
equipment, precisely as a cash flow tax would.
Second, changes in investment patterns have
increasingly moved the corporate tax toward a
cash flow tax. The tax code has always allowed for
the immediate deduction of most kinds of selfdeveloped intangible capital (for example,
employee training, long-range planning done by
executives, advertising, and so forth).29 This type
of investment makes up a substantial and
increasing share of business investment. Consider
the increasing importance of intellectual property
produced by (usually) immediately deductible
salaries paid to workers, versus the declining
importance of machines in factories. One estimate
is that intangible investment has risen from 30
percent of total investment in the 1970s to 60
percent today.30 As a result, the corporate tax
already looked quite a bit like a cash flow tax even
before considering the full expensing of
31
equipment provided by the TCJA.
The net result is that the corporate tax now
resembles a cash flow tax. Indeed, the size of the
corporate tax base has converged to that of the
cash flow tax base over time. The figure shows our
estimates of the actual corporate tax base (in dark
bars) and the corporate cash flow tax base (in light
bars). As is clear from the figure, whereas the two
bases were quite different in the 1970s, more
recently, the size of the bases has been essentially

27

24

As discussed supra note 5, an efficient tax generally distorts
incentives as little as possible. A head tax or lump sum tax requires that
individuals pay a given amount regardless of their behavior. Because
one’s behavior does not affect tax liability, there is no problematic
behavioral response to such a tax. Laurie L. Malman et al., The Individual
Tax Base: Cases, Problems and Policies in Federal Taxation 9 (2002).
25

Put differently, taxes placed on the expected return to risk — if
there’s a single tax rate and full refundability for losses — produces no
real burden on taxpayers. See Evsey D. Domar and Richard A. Musgrave,
“Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking,” 58 Q.J. Econ. 388
(1944); and Louis Kaplow, “Taxation and Risk Taking: A General
Equilibrium Perspective,” 47 Nat’l Tax J. 794 (1994). As a result, the
portion of cash flow taxes that falls on risk creates no real burden, raises
little (risk-adjusted) revenue, and imposes little or no distortion.
26

Edward G. Fox, “Does Capital Bear the Corporate Tax After All?
New Evidence From U.S. Corporate Tax Returns,” 17 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 71 (2020).

2026

One may wonder about how the recent post-TCJA experience
comports with the basic theory. It is difficult to tell for two reasons. First,
it is still early. Second, the predicted effects of the TCJA are ambiguous:
It both reduced rates (which we suggest should have little effect on
investment) and moved toward a cash flow tax (which we suggest
should increase investment). Evidence is mixed at this point. Compare
Robert J. Barro and Jason Furman, “Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017
Tax Reform,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 257 (2018), and
Emanuel Kopp et al., “U.S. Investment Since the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017,” IMF Working Paper 19/120 (2019) (finding little effect of the tax
cuts on investment), with Council of Economic Advisors, “Economic
Report of the President” (Mar. 2019) (suggesting a considerable effect on
investment).
28

Section 168(k). Under the TCJA, full expensing is scheduled to be
phased out in 2023, but it is unclear whether this will actually occur.
Section 168(k)(6).
29

See, e.g., reg. section 1.162-5 and -14.26.

30

Carol A. Corrado and Charles R. Hulten, “How Do You Measure a
‘Technological Revolution’?” 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (2010).
31

Fox, supra note 26.
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32

the same. Although the current tax base could be
both over- and underinclusive relative to a cash
flow tax, these data show quantitatively what our
description of the history of the corporate tax
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suggested: The size of the current corporate tax
33
base is close to the size of the cash flow tax base.
One might worry that as the corporate tax
comes to mirror a cash flow tax, it will become
more efficient but cease to be an important source
of revenue as we shrink the tax base by adding
lots of new deductions. We don’t find this to be
true. The money we could raise from a corporate
cash flow tax is large, with a likely tax base of
about $900 billion today solely from domestic

33

32

The convergence is a result of the statutory changes moving toward
expensing and the increase in share of investment in immediately
deductible intangible capital discussed in the previous two paragraphs
of the text, as well as a falling real normal rate of return. The falling
normal rate of return causes convergence because the timing of
deductions matters less in an environment when (risk-free) interest rates
are low.
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As noted in Fox, supra note 26 and surrounding text, the cash flow
tax base includes both rents and the returns to risk. The existing base
differs from a cash flow tax in two main ways: (1) The tax continues to
require the capitalization of structures, some intangible capital,
inventory, and land, all of which would be immediately deductible
under a cash flow tax (sections 263 and 263A); and (2) the tax continues
to allow the deduction of large portions of net interest, which would be
nondeductible under a (R-base) cash flow tax (section 163).
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34

operations. The figure shows this result
graphically. Over the past half-century, the cash
flow tax base has always been at least 5 percent of
GDP. And, if anything, the corporate cash flow tax
base has risen over time: from about 5.4 percent of
GDP in 1970-2001 to about 6.4 percent in 20022013.
To be clear, nothing in our argument suggests
that there should not also be taxes on the normal
return to capital at the shareholder level. We
merely argue for a higher rate on corporate cash
flows than on the normal return, because the
corporate cash flow tax approximates an efficient
35
rents tax. If we were to fully convert the
corporate tax into a cash flow tax, the normal
return to capital (invested in corporate equity)
would be taxed only through shareholder-level
taxes on dividends and capital gains. Rents, by
contrast, would be taxed at both the corporate and
36
shareholder level, and thus at a higher rate.
B. Rising Rents
A second important change favoring higher
rates is a significant rise of rents in the U.S.
economy. Indeed, these rents are what allow a
cash flow tax to raise significant revenue. Because
taxing rents is not distortionary and is perhaps
even beneficial since doing so reduces rentseeking behavior, this shift presents a golden
opportunity for raising high revenue at a low
efficiency cost.
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Economic rents can accrue to capital providers
for a variety of reasons, any of which are efficient
37
to tax. Even in competitive industries, companies
with lower costs — for example, because of an
advantageous site unavailable to other companies
— earn economic rents. We focus here more on
rents earned through monopoly or other market
power. Rents attributable to market power are
signals of a loss of economic efficiency. Because
the company with market power charges a
supercompetitive price, too few units are sold,
leading to inefficiency.
Evidence increasingly suggests that the U.S.
38
economy suffers from growing rents, whether
because of larger network effects and other
returns to scale,39 increasing industry
40
41
concentration, increases in common ownership,
42
reduced antitrust enforcement, or other factors.
The rise of intellectual property and other
intangible investment has helped move the
corporate tax toward a cash flow tax and, at the
same time, plays an important role in the many
explanations for increasing rents.
An economist’s instinctive answer to a rise in
economic rents attributable to market power is
that antitrust enforcement should be increased to
make the industry more competitive or that
public utilities-type regulation be imposed to
restrict prices to the competitive level. If these
strategies could be perfectly implemented, this is
the first-best solution: These actions reduce the
price to the competitive level, eliminating the
37

34

This figure is admittedly a back-of-the-envelope calculation until
we can access the most recent data. We calculate the cash flow corporate
tax base in 2013 for domestic operations of nonfinancial companies as
about $600 billion. See Fox, supra note 26. Because profit shifting
artificially lowers the size of this base, it seems likely that “true”
domestic cash flows were in fact higher than this. If one scales this figure
up to account for financial C corporations as well, the cash flow base was
likely to be at least $750 billion in 2013. Updating for GDP growth and
inflation yields $915 billion in 2018.
35

It also may make sense to have a tax on the normal return, but this
is a question outside the scope of this report. See Peter Diamond and
Emmanuel Saez, “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research
to Policy Recommendations,” 25 J. Econ. Persp. 165 (2011).
36

Consider this example: B Co. earns $100, which is composed of $60
in supernormal returns and $40 in normal returns to capital. A 40
percent cash flow tax results in $24 of tax at the corporate level ($60 * 40
percent). If the remaining $76 is paid as a dividend to shareholders and
taxed at 20 percent, a tax of $15.20 will be collected at the shareholder
level. If the company had earned only the $40 of normal returns, the tax
rate would have been only the 20 percent dividend rate, yielding $8 of
taxes. Thus, the remaining taxes ($24 + $7.20) must be on the
supernormal returns, yielding a higher cumulative “double tax” rate of
52 percent on those.

2028

True economic rents should be distinguished from so-called quasirents, which are payments to factors of production that appear ex post to
have been unnecessary to secure the contribution of that factor but that
ex ante are needed to induce actors to invest. For example, an optimal
patent system produces quasi-rents for successful inventions that yield a
patent and market power, but viewed from the point of view of the
initial investment, the promise of these rents may be necessary to give
incentives for savers to invest in the first place.
38

See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s
Divided Society Endangers Our Future (2012); and Jason Furman and Peter
Orszag, “A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in
Inequality,” Presentation at a Just Society Centennial Event in Honor of
Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University (Oct. 16, 2015).
39

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop, “Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Inequality,” 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1 (2015). See infra
notes 45 and 46 for discussions of network effects and returns to scale.
40

See, e.g., David H. Autor et al., “The Fall of the Labor Share and the
Rise of Superstar Firms,” Q.J. Econ. (coming).
41

See, e.g., José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu,
“Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership,” 73 J. Fin. 1513 (2018).
42

See, e.g., Lina M. Khan and Sandeep Vaheesan, “Market Power and
Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents,” 11
Harv. L. & Pol. Rev. 235 (2017).
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social loss from market power. Taxing these rents,
by contrast, affects the distribution of the
monopoly profits but does not eliminate the
efficiency costs of market power. Nevertheless, in
the real world in which antitrust enforcement is
imperfect, taxing rents may be a good option
43
alongside antitrust. Indeed, as Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah has pointed out, the modern corporate
tax was enacted in the early 20th century in part as
44
an anti-monopoly tool.
In particular, companies with powerful
45
46
network effects or positive returns to scale may
limit the usefulness of traditional antitrust
remedies like breaking up dominant companies
and, to a lesser extent, even blocking mergers. If
the returns to scale or network effects are large
enough, breaking up the company can make
consumers worse, rather than better, off. Put
differently, a productively efficient monopolist
that can take advantage of scale will charge less
than a bunch of competitive but productively
inefficient small companies. This issue of “natural
monopolies” is not new. Traditionally, these kinds
of companies are regulated as public utilities with
regulators trying to set the price charged at the
competitive level. It is outside the scope of the
report to consider whether regulating technology
companies like Google or Facebook like a public
utility47 or generally stepping up antitrust
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enforcement are good ideas; for now, we just note
that current competition policy appears to allow
48
broad potential scope for earning rents.
Thus, a rents-focused corporate tax with a
high rate may be a good option to raise revenue
and provide for a more progressive distribution of
those rents than in the absence of the tax. In terms
of efficiency, although it does not combat
monopoly pricing, the tax avoids some of the
problems created by either antitrust or economic
49
regulation. It is relatively simple to administer
and does not require measuring relevant markets
or directly intervening in businesses. Indeed,
although the tax would leave in place the
inefficiency associated with market power, it
would still have its own efficiency benefits:
Because the tax is highly efficient, it would allow
for the reduction in other distortionary taxes.
And finally, higher taxes on rents discourage
some inefficient rent-seeking behavior, such as
lobbying to get laws changed to allow businesses
to gain monopolies or otherwise drive out
competition. If the returns to that behavior are
taxed at high rates, the behavior itself should
decline. For rent-seeking to be deterred, however,
the rent-seeking expenses must be nondeductible
from taxes. Otherwise, for the same reason that
other investment behavior will not be
discouraged by a tax on rents, that tax will not
discourage rent-seeking behavior. But many such
costs are nondeductible, such as lobbying,50 bribes

43

Tax scholars in general have begun paying more attention to the
relationship of tax and market concentration. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman,
Mitchell Kane, and Alan Sykes, “Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle to
Capture MNE Profits,” 72 Tax L. Rev. (coming 2020) (comparing policies
for capturing multinational corporations’ rents). See also Louis Kaplow,
“Market Power and Income Taxation” (working paper, 2019) (discussing
the relationship between rents and taxes on labor income). But to our
knowledge, the interaction of rents-focused taxes and a reduction in the
use or effectiveness of antitrust strategies had not been explored in detail
prior to this article.
44

Avi-Yonah, “Antitrust and the Corporate Tax: A Missed
Opportunity?” (working paper, 2020).
45

For example, large areas of the tech sector feature important
network effects. This means that a product becomes more useful by
having more users, as with a social network like Facebook. Likewise,
tech companies often enjoy significant positive returns to scale, which
occurs when they are able to spread fixed costs across a large number of
customer-users with little marginal cost. Consider, for example, Google’s
algorithm: It would cost almost the same to develop and deploy it
whether Google had 1 million or 1 billion users per day.
46

One source of returns to scale is that it can be easier to develop
better products when more people use your product. For example,
Google’s director of research once famously said, “We don’t have better
algorithms than anyone else; we just have more data.” Scott Cleland,
“Google’s ‘Infringenovation’ Secrets,” Forbes (Oct. 3, 2011).
47

The experience with direct regulation is mixed. See, e.g., Alfred E.
Kahn, “Airline Deregulation — A Mixed Bag, but a Clear Success
Nevertheless,” 16 Transp. L.J. 229 (1987).
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48

Not all companies that may be earning rents report large taxable
incomes today. Some companies (e.g., Amazon) plow back much of their
profits into new expensed investment, reducing taxable income now. But
if these projects earn rents, they will be hit at the statutory rate in the
future. Also, many companies (e.g., Apple) have used profit shifting to
reduce taxable income to well below their “true” U.S. cash flows. This
highlights the importance of international avoidance, but the large size
of the estimated cash flow base reveals important limits to this
phenomenon as well.
49

Note as well that a tax that raises the marginal costs of monopolists
will often be less efficient than a similar tax on a competitive industry
because it exacerbates the monopolist’s underproduction of output. See,
e.g., Andy H. Barnett, “The Pigouvian Tax Rule Under Monopoly,” 70
Am. Econ. Rev. 1037 (1980). A rents tax, however, does not raise marginal
costs and is efficient. If a rents tax cannot be perfectly targeted on rents
only, it may have some efficiency costs, which should be considered in
setting the rates of the rents tax.
50

Nondeductible lobbying expenses include campaign contributions,
any attempt to influence legislation, participation in a political
campaign, any attempt to influence the public regarding elections or
legislation, and any communication with specified executive branch
officials. Section 162(e).
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and kickbacks, fines and fees for breaking laws
and regulations,51 and nonfinancial costs of rentseeking like criminal penalties for violating
antitrust laws or simply feelings of guilt or
unease.52 So, even independent of the revenue
raised from the tax on rents, such a tax has
salutary effects. And as the corporate tax has
increasingly targeted rents, the potential
importance of this rent-seeking deterrent has
increased.
Before moving on, one may wonder how the
two big reasons suggesting higher rates relate to
each other. In particular, if — in a simple world —
rents should be taxed at 100 percent, and we say
that the first reason for higher corporate tax rates
is that “the corporate tax base is now focused on
rents,” who cares about this second reason, rising
rents? It may seem that if rents are a small part of
the economy or a big part, the first reason implies
that we should have a high corporate tax rate
because it’s good to get (as close to) 100 percent of
those rents as possible, small or large as they may
be.
If readers consider the first reason sufficient
for us to have made our case, we do not object.
However, we think that a more nuanced analysis
shows that the two reasons reinforce each other.
First, although the corporate tax has moved closer
to a cash flow tax focused on rents, it is not the
case that the corporate income tax purely targets
rents, so a larger share of profits going to rents
will make this imperfectly targeted tax more
concentrated on rents, which we should tax at a
higher rate. Second, given this imperfect targeting
and the effect of taxing rents on discouraging
rent-seeking, greater rents mean more benefits
from higher rates. Third, policy changes typically
require overcoming political inertia and
allocating scarce domestic political capital. And
more rents mean that the gains to overcoming that
inertia and taxing rents at higher rates are greater.

51

Section 162(c) and (f).

52

The nondeductible nonfinancial costs of rent-seeking may be a
considerable deterrent to rent-seeking. For example, Thomas Piketty,
Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva find that higher top labor rates are
associated with less rent-seeking by CEOs, which they attribute to the
nondeductible costs of that rent-seeking. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva,
“Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities,” 6
Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol’y 230 (2014). These same costs may be
nondeductible for both employees and businesses.
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C. Other Reasons
Apart from these two changes, three other
factors militate in favor of higher corporate tax
rates.
1. Distribution.
Taxes levied on economic rents accruing to
capital are likely to be highly progressive, because
the incidence of taxes on these rents will probably
be borne primarily by the providers of business
53
capital. The debate about the incidence of the
54
corporate tax is old, with some saying that much
55
is borne by labor. That analysis is different from
ours, since it did not concern a tax on rents but
rather a tax on normal returns to capital. Because
a tax on rents does not change incentives on the
margin, it is less likely to be passed on to other
parties than a tax on normal returns, driving its
progressive distribution.56
2. Labor income masquerading as capital.
Currently, an entrepreneur or other business
owner is eligible for favorable tax treatment at
capital rates for what was arguably a labor
endeavor. For example, Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg is one of the world’s richest people
primarily because of his labor contribution, not
because of a capital contribution with a gigantic
risk premium. He now owns stock worth more
than $67 billion on which he is eligible for
indefinite deferral of personal taxes through the

53

George Fane, “The Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: The Old
Reason for the Old Answer,” 92 J. Pol. Econ. 329 (1984). But see Lily
Batchelder, “The Shaky Case for a Business Cash-Flow Tax Over a
Business Income Tax,” 70 Nat’l Tax J. 901, 919-920 (2017) (describing
theory and empirical evidence for how companies may share some rents
with workers). Some evidence suggests that rent sharing did not cause
companies to redirect much of the windfall from the TCJA rate cut to
workers. In one large survey, just 4 percent of companies reported that
they had dedicated at least some funds from the rate cut to employee
salary. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, “Business News: Tax Cuts Have Limited
Effect on Pay,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2018 (reporting this and
other similar surveys). Companies seem unlikely to be hesitant to report
they have increased wages because of the TCJA, so this survey data
seems telling.
54

Arnold C. Harberger, “The Incidence of the Corporation Income
Tax,” 70 J. Pol. Econ. 215 (1962).
55

See, e.g., Jennifer Gravelle, “Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of
General Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis,” 66 Nat’l Tax J. 185 (2013)
(reviewing analyses using Harberger’s model and concluding that labor
bore about 40 percent of corporate taxes on the normal return).
56

Fox, supra note 26, contains a more detailed exploration of this issue
and comparison to Harberger-style models.

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, JUNE 22, 2020

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/199
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3657324
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

12

Fox and Liscow:

corporate form and capital gains rates if he ever
realizes income.57 Raising taxes on businesses
would encourage entrepreneurs to take salaries
that matched their labor contributions, equalizing
taxes on all forms of labor income. Likewise, it
would stop tax shelters in which individuals with
sufficiently long time horizons can incorporate
their businesses, retain earnings (including what
should be labor income), and reduce their tax
burdens. This phenomenon was common in past
eras,58 and given the relationship between the top
individual rate and the new 21 percent corporate
59
rate, it may well return.
3. Second-best taxes and politics.
Even if a corporate tax were not the most
efficient tax, it is arguably one of the best available
second-best taxes. Voters tend to believe that taxes
or subsidies benefit or harm the party on whom
60
they are statutorily incident. Overwhelmingly,
middle-class Americans get their income from
their labor, not ownership of corporations. So
corporate taxes tend to be relatively popular.61 At
the same time, there is widespread resistance to
the kind of redistribution through taxes on labor
that might maximize welfare because people have
strong intuitions that people deserve to keep a
substantial share of the income that they earn,
making taxing away a very large share of labor

57

Section 1(h). In principle, Zuckerberg is subject to capital gains
taxes on sales of his stock and personal taxes on dividends at the capital
gains rate, but Facebook has never paid a dividend. Donna Fuscaldo,
“Facebook: First FANG Stock to Pay a Cash Dividend?” Investopedia,
June 25, 2019. Zuckerberg holds about 12 million class A shares and 365
million high-vote class B shares. Facebook Inc., “Proxy Statement” (Apr.
12, 2019).
58

Kleinbard, “Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax
Rate Environment,” University of Southern California Research Papers
Series No. C13-5 (2013).
59

Shawn Bayern, “An Unintended Consequence of Reducing the
Corporate Tax Rate,” Tax Notes, Nov. 20, 2017, p. 1137; and David Kamin
et al., “The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches
Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,” 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1445 (2019).
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earnings challenging. Thus, at least to the extent
that corporate taxation is at least as efficient (for a
given level of progressivity) as directly raising
taxes on labor income, this factor favors higher
corporate taxes.
Thus far, we have an argument for taxing
corporations on a cash flow basis at a very high
rate. But the argument is not so simple; we turn
next to counterarguments.
III. Potential Drawbacks
We have described several reasons to support
higher corporate tax rates. But we do not want to
lose sight of the arguments on the other side —
favoring lower corporate tax rates — that need to
be weighed against these new and preexisting
reasons to support higher corporate taxes. We
divide these responses into two parts. First, we
briefly discuss international mobility. These
concerns have been well explored elsewhere, but
63
we briefly review them here. Our point is not to
rehash the merits and demerits of the
international mobility debate. Rather, we largely
put that issue to the side and focus our discussion
on the domestic issues in a corporate tax designed
to target rents.
A. International Mobility
As mentioned in the introduction, current
thinking emphasizes international competition in
setting corporate tax rates, which Section II
ignored. International mobility allows companies
to move activities abroad to avoid high domestic
tax rates. Of course, some economic activity
cannot be moved — such as activity benefiting
from a natural resource or particularly
advantageous location. Similarly, if a company is
considering investing in a project likely to earn
the normal return so that effectively no tax will be
levied through a cash flow tax, companies would
not seek to shift that project to a jurisdiction with
a lower statutory rate.

60

See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, “The Psychology of Taxes: Why They
Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane,” 16 Va. Tax Rev. 155
(1996).
61

From 2004 to present, 60 percent to 70 percent of Gallup
respondents have said that corporations pay too little in taxes. Gallup,
“Taxes” (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). In a 2017 Politico survey, only 34
percent of respondents approved of the TCJA corporate tax cut. Aaron
Lorenzo, “Corporate Tax Cut Unpopular With Voters, Poll Shows,”
Politico, Sept. 6, 2017.
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See, e.g., Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership:
Taxes and Justice (2002); Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Fairness and Folk Justice
(2013); Matthew Weinzierl, “Popular Acceptance of Inequality Due to
Innate Brute Luck and Support for Classical Benefit-Based Taxation,” 155
J. Pub. Econ. 54 (2017); and Zachary Liscow, “Redistribution for Realists”
(working paper, 2020).
63

See supra note 14.
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But there are at least three types of ways in
which companies may shift activity or profits
abroad in response to a high cash flow tax. First,
companies may shift more of their profits abroad
without moving “real activity” (that is,
employment and capital investment on the
ground). Common methods are mispricing
transactions between subsidiaries,64 strategic use
65
and mispricing of debt among subsidiaries, or
other accounting tricks that shift measured
income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax
ones. Another step to avoid high U.S. taxes
without shifting real activity — and one with high
political salience — is moving the corporate
66
domicile abroad, known as inversion. Second,
even projects earning the normal return might be
shifted abroad in response to a high cash flow tax,
if doing so makes it easier to shift existing rents to
low-tax jurisdictions. Third, some projects may
have the potential to earn rents in multiple locales.
For those projects, high taxes on rents encourage
67
moving real activity abroad. As a result,
companies sometimes consider the statutory rate,
even under a cash flow tax, leading them to
potentially avoid locating rent-earning projects in
a jurisdiction with a high cash flow tax rate,
especially if the source of the rent is relatively
mobile (for example, intellectual property).
Thus, a cash flow tax with a high rate is likely
to put pressure on the tax system’s ability to
64

Transfer pricing manipulation involves mispricing transactions
between related entities in a manner that shifts profits from one
jurisdiction to another. For example, a multinational corporation “can
charge a lower price when selling to a related party in a low-tax
country,” reducing the profits booked in the high-tax jurisdiction and
increasing the profits booked in the low-tax jurisdiction. Li Liu, Tim
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Dongxian Guo, “International Transfer Pricing
and Tax Avoidance: Evidence From Linked Trade-Tax Statistics in the
UK,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Papers No. 1214 (2017).
65

See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, “Inversions, Related Party Expenditures, and
Source Taxation: Changing the Paradigm for the Taxation of Foreign and
Foreign-Owned Businesses,” 2016 BYU L. Rev. 1837, 1856-1858; section
163(j); and reg. section 1.385-1 to -4.
66

See sections 59A, 951A, and 7874; and Donald Marples and Jane
Gravelle, “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues,”
Congressional Research Service, RR43568 (Mar. 2019). Mechanically,
inverting will not itself usually change the sourcing of profits but instead
reduces taxable income in the United States by eliminating U.S. tax on
non-U.S.-source income taxable today under the global intangible lowtaxed income regime for a U.S. domiciled company but not for the now
inverted (and thus) foreign domiciled company. Moreover, inversion
opens the door for additional profit shifting out of what was U.S.-source
income because doing so is now no longer deterred by GILTI (although
that shifting may still be limited somewhat by the base erosion and
antiabuse tax). GILTI and the BEAT are discussed in more detail later.
67

Devereux and Griffith, supra note 14.
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contain profit shifting and inversions, and to
some extent encourage multinationals to locate
real activity abroad. We do not take issue with
these well-worn arguments, which we take as a
baseline. We merely wish to note important
arguments pointing in the other direction. We also
discuss potential reforms to limit these pressures
in Section IV.
B. Domestic Taxation Issues
1. Inability to provide full refundability.
Under the theory discussed in Section II, a
cash flow tax does not distort investment
decisions if, at the time of the investment,
companies are provided a tax benefit whose value
matches the tax rate multiplied by the investment
amount. So if the rate is 21 percent, and a
company invests $1,000, the company must
receive a benefit from the government upfront of
$210. If the company has positive net income, a
deduction works fine. But if the company is in a
loss position, receiving a deduction of $1,000 will
have a present value of less than $210 because the
government does not refund the loss; instead, the
company is only allowed to deduct the loss
against income in future years.68 Indeed, the
leading study suggests that these net operating
losses are worth only about 50 percent of their face
value because they are not indexed for interest or
inflation, and the company may never earn
69
enough taxable income to use them. Further, the
absence of full refundability also threatens the
neutrality of taxes nominally falling on the return
to risk. This problem would be exacerbated by a
cash flow tax at a high rate because the
government would tax the upside when projects
succeed but not fully refund losses on the
downside when projects fail. Companies facing a
regime with high rates and low-value NOLs may
avoid risky projects that, even after adjusting for
risk, have a higher pretax net present value, thus
raising the social cost of taxes.

68

Section 172. Note that the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136), passed in reaction to COVID-19,
temporarily loosened these restrictions. See EY, “Corporate Implications
of the CARES Act” (Apr. 16, 2020).
69

Michael G. Cooper and Matthew J. Knittel, “The Implications of
Tax Asymmetry for U.S. Corporations,” 63 Nat’l Tax J. 33 (2010).
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2. Distorting organizational form.
Applying a full cash flow tax at a relatively
high rate to C corporations without changing
passthrough taxation would provide an incentive
for companies to organize as passthroughs, unless
they need access to public securities markets. In
some ways, this would mimic the incentives
before the TCJA, except more so. We believe this
is less of a problem than one might at first think.
Acknowledging that there has been significant
erosion in the share of income earned by C
70
corporations over time, there is a relatively
inelastic group of very large companies that need
to access public markets and thus be C
71
corporations. This can make it efficient — if we
must have two different tax regimes, and there’s a
reason (perhaps a political one) to have a higher
rate for public corporations — to set the C
corporation rate higher and use public trading as
the dividing line.72
A more comprehensive solution to this
problem would involve unifying the regime
facing all but the smallest businesses, using an
entity-level cash flow tax. As noted earlier, the
arguments in favor of a cash flow tax at the entity
level apply to nearly all businesses, not just C
73
corporations. Indeed, the arguments are
potentially stronger for passthroughs, which are
less likely to shift projects abroad in reaction to
the tax because they are less likely to be
74
international in scope. There is also some
evidence that the rise in inequality is linked to the

70

Cooper et al., “Business in the United States: Who Owns It and
How Much Tax They Pay,” 30 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 91 (2016); and Scott
Eastman, “Corporate and Pass-Through Business Income and Returns
Since 1980,” Tax Foundation (Apr. 23, 2019). Also, as private capital
markets have become more liquid, the relative benefits of being public
for many businesses have shrunk over time.
71

As well, start-ups funded by venture capital often organize as C
corporations rather than as passthroughs, for reasons including
minimizing legal and organizational costs, the ability to provide
compensation through stock options, and the prevalence of tax-exempt
institutional investors. Bankman, “The Structure of Silicon Valley StartUps,” 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1737 (1994). See also Gregg Polsky, “Explaining
Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups,” 70 Hastings L.J.
409 (2019).
72

See Ari Glogower and Kamin, “The Progressivity Ratchet,” 104
Minn. L. Rev. 1500 (2020).
73

See supra note 4; and Treasury, supra note 11.

74

Kyle Pomerleau, “An Overview of Pass-Through Businesses in the
United States,” Tax Foundation (Jan. 21, 2015) (showing that the vast
majority of passthroughs are sole proprietorships, are generally smaller
than C corporations, and are concentrated in the service sector rather
than in manufacturing and trade).
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increasing use of passthrough taxation, providing
further support for higher tax rates on them.75
Further, for privately held businesses, cash flow
taxation may help share risk by absorbing some of
the upside and downside of businesses with few
76
owners. At minimum, there are good reasons, in
77
addition to the administrability concerns, to
repeal the new 20 percent passthrough deduction
78
in the TCJA.
3. Other potential issues.
Here, we briefly consider some other potential
drawbacks to high cash flow taxation. First, as
Lily Batchelder points out, business executives
untutored in the mechanics of cash flow taxation
may be attentive to the full statutory rate, acting
as if they will have to pay it even if they actually
effectively pay no taxes on their investments that
earn the normal return.79 Although executives
may adjust over time, especially in a system with
high rates and full expensing, this factor still gives
us some pause. Second, in some cases, high-rate
cash flow taxes may worsen agency problems
within companies, reducing principals’ incentives
to monitor the companies’ agents — for example,
when the monitoring costs are not tax deductible
(for example, at a nonprofit) but profits are taxed
80
at a high rate. Note though that this effect is
limited by the fact that the cost of much
monitoring, such as the wages paid at taxable
companies to employees who monitor portfolio
performance, is tax deductible and thus not
subject to this concern. Third, the one-time
75

Matthew Smith et al., “Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century,” 134
Q.J. Econ. 1675 (2019).
76

Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We
Know,” 20 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 1 (2005). For public companies, shareholders
can fairly easily diversify by holding many companies in their portfolio.
Thus, the government — through cash flow taxation — will not be a
much superior risk bearer to the marginal diversified shareholder. But
for private companies, the marginal shareholder is subject to sizable
idiosyncratic risk that the government diversifies away by holding in its
“tax portfolio” a large number of companies.
77

Daniel N. Shaviro, “Evaluating the New U.S. Pass-Through Rates,”
2018 Brit. Tax Rev. 49 (2018).
78
79

Section 199A.
See Batchelder, supra note 53.

80

For example, consider a nontaxable investor-owner (the principal)
like a university or pension fund. Money that the investor expends
monitoring agents at companies in its portfolio may raise profits at those
companies, but the amount of those profits that the investor captures
falls as the corporate tax rate rises. By contrast, the investor gets no tax
benefit from incurring the monitoring costs, because its costs are
nondeductible. Thus, it may do less monitoring with a higher corporate
tax rate.
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introduction of this system has the potential to
substantially reduce the value of business equity,
which will likely be unpopular with important
parts of the electorate, particularly, but not limited
to, retirees and soon-to-be retirees, who hold large
amounts of this equity as savings. If the policy is
81
revenue-neutral — that is, accompanied by
reductions in other distortionary taxes — there
could be at least as many winners as losers from
the change, but an attempt to compensate some
middle-income investors and retirees might well
82
be warranted.
IV. What to Do?
Basic theory suggests that rents accruing to
capital providers should be taxed at a very high
rate through a cash flow tax. However, the theory
has holes. What are policymakers looking at the
current corporate tax to do? We argue that there
are strong reasons to have higher corporate rates,
especially if issues of international avoidance are
further addressed and the tax is even more closely
targeted at economic rents. We discuss ways to do
so here. We fully acknowledge, however, that we
are operating in an arena with great uncertainty
— regarding both the ways to improve the
corporate tax, especially to reduce international
avoidance, as well as weighing the pros and cons
of a higher tax rate.
A. International Avoidance
In light of the concern that higher taxes would
lead to an increase in shifting profits or economic
activity abroad or outright corporate inversions,
Congress could adopt other measures aimed at
these issues. We do not intend here to list all
possible options or all the upsides and downsides
of the options we discuss, but rather to show that
options remain on the table for combating
international avoidance.
The TCJA made substantial changes to the
international side of U.S. corporate taxation,
including introducing the base erosion and
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antiabuse tax and the global intangible low-taxed
income regime. The BEAT is designed to combat
profit shifting from U.S. operations of foreign and
domestic multinationals by creating a minimum
tax based on payments made to foreign related
83
parties. At a high level, the BEAT can be thought
of as partly denying deductions for payments
made to foreign related parties (usually
subsidiaries) for rent, interest, royalties, and
many services because those deductions may be
inflated by profit shifting.84
The GILTI provision is a global minimum tax
that is applied to a specific tax base, after
excluding a 10 percent return on physical assets,
85
to focus on income derived from intangibles.
GILTI, like the BEAT, is largely designed to
prevent profit shifting from higher-corporate-tax
countries. It is too soon to know with much
certainty how well these changes are working to
limit the effective mobility of various kinds of
86
rents under the current rate structure. Increasing
the statutory corporate tax rate without increasing
the BEAT and GILTI rates would increase the
incentive for shifting profits abroad. So, to the
extent these provisions are working well, it would
make sense to increase those rates
commensurately with the increase in the statutory
rate.
One potential broader reform might move us
back to(ward) a worldwide tax regime, but with

83

Section 59A.

84

The BEAT has been subject to criticism as poorly targeted to its
goals. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, “10 Reasons Congress Should Revisit
the BEAT,” Tax Notes, June 18, 2018, p. 1701; and Michael J. Graetz, “The
Future of the New International Tax Regime,” 24 Fordham J. Corp. &
Fin. L. 219, 267 (2019) (“There is a question as to whether [the BEAT]
ought to be fixed or ought to be eliminated. I do not think it can be fixed
in its current form.”). The BEAT has strong defenders as well. See, e.g.,
Bret Wells, “Get With the BEAT,” Tax Notes, Feb. 19, 2018, p. 1023.
85

Section 951A. The design of GILTI has also been questioned. Some
criticize GILTI as overly harsh, particularly in its treatment of foreign tax
credits and measurement of intangible income. Others criticize GILTI in
the opposite direction — as too lenient — because of its allowance for
cross-crediting from high- to low-tax-rate countries, frequent
understatement of intangible income, narrow focus only on intangible
income, and low rate. Gravelle and Marples, “Issues in International
Corporate Taxation: The 2017 Revision (P.L. 115-97),” CRS, R45186, at
35-38 (Apr. 23, 2020).
86

81

Increasing revenue by taxing rents should leave private actors
better off than raising similar revenue through other mechanisms
because taxing rents is more efficient.
82

On the other hand, given the tilt in our social welfare policies
toward older Americans, some might not find it desirable to offset the
effect of a one-time introduction of higher cash flow taxes.

2034

The CBO recently reduced its estimate of how much money would
be raised by the international provisions of the TCJA, including the
BEAT and GILTI, over the next decade by about $100 billion, citing
taxpayers’ responses to the law and the regulations implementing those
provisions. It emphasized, however, the uncertainty remaining in its
current estimates. See CBO Director Phillip L. Swagel, “Recent Changes
in CBO’s Projections of Corporate Income Tax Revenues,” CBO Blog
(Feb. 7, 2020).
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no deferral, a somewhat lower rate for some kinds
of foreign cash flows, and with foreign taxes that
87
88
are only partially credited. As part of that move,
Congress could do more to restrain inversions —
for example, by not allowing larger U.S.
companies to invert by merging into smaller
foreign companies, as under the Obama
administration’s proposed toughening of section
7874, although there are questions about how
89
effective that would be. Moreover, the existence
of large economic rents raises the potential gains
from international cooperation on profit shifting
and reduces the likelihood that international tax
competition is beneficial.90 It therefore reinforces
the potential gains from the recent OECD
initiative for a global minimum tax to deter
avoidance, which would in turn make the use of a
91
worldwide source-based regime more practical.
At a minimum, as Dani Rodrik points out,
international treaties could focus more on the
92
coordination of tax rates.
Another reform would turn the corporate tax
into a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT),
under which the inclusion of revenue and
allowability of deductions are determined by the
location of the final sale of the good or service.
Proponents of this reform argue that it would end
inversions and profit shifting by changing the
focus of sourcing rules to the location of
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customers, which is hard for businesses to
manipulate.93 A DBCFT may address many
94
concerns with profit shifting, but there remain
potential problems, including inducing large
shifts in U.S. currency (which should be
proportional to the rate of the DBCFT) and treaty
95
compliance.
It is also worth noting that fears over the
negative effects of the United States having a
higher corporate rate than other countries are
sometimes overblown. Corporations locate places
for many reasons, including the wages that they
must pay (which depends in part on other types
of taxes, like income taxes) and the benefits
yielded from higher taxes, like more educated
workers and better infrastructure. There is little
special about the corporate tax rate as part of this
bundle, except for changing corporate residency
and profit shifting among locations. This reality is
part of why, at the pre-TCJA 35 percent rate, the
corporate tax still raised a lot of revenue — on
average more than $300 billion per year in the five
years before the TCJA came into effect — even
96
without further antiavoidance measures. And
although debate continues over what would be
most effective, many agree that more can be done
97
to mitigate international avoidance.

87

See Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation (2014); Office of
Management and Budget, “Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of the U.S.
Government” (2016) (presenting the Obama administration’s proposal
for a minimum tax of 19 percent of foreign income on a per-country basis
with partial crediting of foreign taxes). Under the TCJA, GILTI income is
subject to tax with only a partial allowance for foreign tax credits.
Section 951A.
88

Note that the various reforms may to some extent work at cross
purposes. One goal in restricting an inversion is to prevent foreign
economic activity currently part of a U.S. company from becoming part
of a non-U.S. company (i.e., the inverted company). Increasing effective
rates on foreign profits, however, may put U.S. companies at a
disadvantage when investing abroad, so that more economic activity
abroad ends up being done by non-U.S. companies, akin to what might
happen under the inversion. Cf. Mihir Desai and James Hines Jr.,
“Evaluating International Tax Reform,” 56 Nat’l Tax J. 487 (2003).
89

See, e.g., Scott DeAngelis, Note, “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join
Them: The U.S. Solution to the Issue of Corporate Inversions,” 48 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 1353 (2015) (arguing that the proposed changes to section
7874 would not deter inversions).
90

See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala, “Do Multinational Firms Use Tax
Havens to the Detriment of Other Countries?” Working Paper, at 34
(2019).
91

OECD, “Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) — Pillar
Two” (Nov. 8, 2019 - Dec. 2, 2019).
92

Rodrik, “What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?” 32 J. Econ. Persp.
73 (2018).
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Auerbach et al., supra note 8. A related but distinct approach is for
corporate taxes to be based on global income apportioned by the location
of sales. See, e.g., Clausing, “Taxing Multinational Companies in the 21st
Century,” in Tackling the Tax Code: Efficient and Equitable Ways to Raise
Revenue 237 (2020); and Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Michael C. Durst,
“Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a
Formulary Profit Split,” 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2008).
94

Further, note that although a DBCFT resembles a VAT in many
ways, the predicted incidence of the taxes is quite different. A VAT is
generally thought to be borne by all consumers in proportion to their
consumption. A DBCFT, as a cash flow business tax, will likely be largely
borne by capital owners (rent-financed consumption). Thus, a DBCFT
with a high rate may fit more easily into a progressive tax system than a
VAT with a high rate.
95

See Graetz, “The Known Unknowns of the Business Tax Reforms
Proposed in the House Republican Blueprint,” 8 Colum. J. Tax L. 117
(2017). But on treaty compatibility, see Itai Grinberg, “A DestinationBased Cash Flow Tax Can Be Structured to Comply With World Trade
Organization Rules,” 70 Nat’l Tax J. 803 (2017).
96

See Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, “Amount of Revenue by
Source,” supra note 15.
97

See, e.g., OECD, “OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,” at 16 (Feb. 2020)
(affirming “the importance of the worldwide implementation of the G20/
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package” and discussing
“the important work which remains to be carried out”).
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B. Refining the Focus on Economic Rents
Policy changes can also help address a variety
of concerns about how the corporate tax targets
rents.
In response to the concern that imperfect loss
offsets mean that a corporate cash flow tax is no
longer primarily a tax on rents, the tax code could
provide more generous NOLs — first undoing the
98
less generous treatment enacted in the TCJA, but
then going beyond that, such as by adjusting for
inflation and possibly providing interest on NOL
recovery. The code could make immediate
refunds easier, for example, by allowing refunds
against payroll or other taxes, as the research tax
99
credit does. Or the code could simply allow the
sale of NOLs, which would be akin to full
refundability, although it might be politically
unpopular or lead to concerns about fraud.
Most basically, expensing could also extend to
structures, inventory, and the types of selfdeveloped intangible property that are now
capitalized.100 Doing so would help finish the
transformation of the corporate tax into a cash
flow tax.
If we do move to full expensing (and probably
also under the status quo), we would want to
curtail interest deductions. With full expensing,
allowing interest deductions can result in a
negative tax rate, causing projects with negative
pretax value being funded — for example, if the
loan comes from a tax-exempt party that will not
pay tax that corresponds to the deduction
received by the loan recipient.101 To avoid this

98

Section 172(a)(2)(ii) and (b)(1)(A) (imposing an 80 percent
limitation on the amount of taxable income NOLs can absorb in a year
and ending NOL carryback). For example, the more generous treatment
in the CARES Act could be extended.
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undesirable result, interest deductions and
inclusions for nonfinancial companies102 should be
eliminated in keeping with cash flow tax
103
principles.
In response to the concern that
entrepreneurial laborers would have their labor
taxed at inappropriately high capital rates, there
are two responses. First, entrepreneurs could
actually receive income from their labor in the
form of labor income! In other words, higher
corporate tax rates could simply cause a more
appropriate labeling of income. One may
respond, quite sensibly, however, that small
companies are liquidity-constrained,
necessitating payment in equity. In response to
that, the tax law could give companies, say, five
years to become liquid enough to pay a higher
salary to the entrepreneur. In other words, the
code could give small companies five years to
recharacterize income to the company as labor
costs, allowing time for the company to gain more
liquidity and pay a reasonable salary to
entrepreneurs. If a company opts to pay these
larger salaries ex post, the code could tax the
entrepreneur and provide a refund to the
company.
C. What Rate?
Ultimately, policymakers must decide what
the corporate tax rate will be. We cannot tell them
exactly what that rate should be. But we can offer
both guidance and the caution that, just as we do
not know, neither do those who suggest low rates
largely on grounds of international competition.104
If there were no issues of international
competition, we would suggest high rates under a
cash flow tax. For example, proponents of moving
to a destination basis have argued that it would
eliminate nearly all incentives for shifting profits

99

Section 41(h).

100

Sections 263 and 263A.

101

Recall that for a project earning the normal return, the government
provides an upfront investment of τ to the company, and (without
interest deductions) collects taxes with a present value of τ over the life
of the project. In practice, this exempts the normal return. If interest
deductions are allowed for loans made by tax-exempt entities, the
government collects less than τ over the life of the project in taxes and is
in practice subsidizing those projects. See Institute for Fiscal Studies,
“The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation” (1978) (explaining that
under the R-base cash flow tax that our system most closely resembles,
interest should not be deductible or includable).
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102

Financial firms are an exception because they are in the business of
adding value through providing loans, so excluding their interest from
taxation would leave the services they provide undertaxed.
103

Section 163.

104

This conclusion is strengthened by the empirical uncertainty about
the impacts of corporate tax reform arising from both the difficulty of
finding good natural experiments and the changing domestic and
international features of the corporate tax. Auerbach, “Measuring the
Effects of Corporate Tax Cuts,” 32 J. Econ. Persp. 97 (2018).
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105

and real activity. If this is true — and we could
also carry out the domestic reforms discussed
earlier — we would suggest a rate of at least 50
percent. This is about the statutory rate that the
United States had from the 1950s to 1970s, a time
of high economic growth but also limited
106
international competition. Notably, the
corporate tax was considerably less focused on
rents during that period compared with today, so
these high rates would probably be more efficient
now than they were at midcentury.107 Even though
the most basic theory might imply it, we would
not suggest a corporate tax rate of nearly 100
percent because the corporate tax is not — and is
not likely to ever be, even after further honing the
tax — a tax purely on rents because of the
concerns about nonrefundable losses and
distorting risk-taking, issues in conforming the
taxation of what are now passthroughs,
recharacterization of income as salaries, effects on
entrepreneurship, agency problems, and other
domestic policy design issues. Further, if we
cannot tackle the domestic reforms suggested in
this report, we would suggest rates somewhat less
than 50 percent, even if the international side was
largely “solved.”
But in fact, many of the most important issues
now are international. In general, the higher the
corporate tax rate goes, the stronger the intensity
of profit shifting, changes in the location of real
activity or who owns that activity, and incentives
to invert. We could therefore keep our 21 percent
rate, which is in line with or below that of most
108
other industrialized countries. But that decision
would risk ignoring the strong reasons to have
higher rates that we describe in this report.
Ultimately, the right rate depends significantly on
our ability to address international concerns: The
better the system deters shifting of profits and real
105

See, e.g., Auerbach et al., supra note 8; and Auerbach and Devereux,
“Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting,” 10 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol’y
69 (2018). Many scholars dispute that moving to a destination basis will
in fact close off nearly all shifting of profits and real activity. See, e.g.,
Avi-Yonah and Clausing, “Problems With Destination-Based Corporate
Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint,” 8 Colum. J. Tax L. 229, 247-249 (2017).
106

See Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, “Marginal Corporate Tax
Rates, 1942-2020” (Mar. 25, 2020). Real per-capita annual GDP growth
averaged 2.5 percent per year from 1950 to 1980, while it has been 1.7
percent since. Authors’ calculation based on data from St. Louis Fed
(FRED).
107
108

Fox, supra note 26, at 104-115.
OECD, “Statutory Corporate Tax Rate” (Jan. 2020).
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activity, the more coordination across countries
there is, etc., the higher the tax rate should go. But
neither we nor others are in a great position to
weigh the factors.
We end with a hunch: that a sensible
approach, at least if some of the international
issues could be dealt with, would be to set the
corporate tax rate about equal to the top labor tax
rate. Doing so would at least simplify the taxation
of corporations by reducing — although not
eliminating — the incentive to recharacterize
labor income as capital income or vice versa.
Equalizing the tax on income earned through
labor and corporate equity for high earners is
complicated, in part because of the shareholderlevel taxes on dividends and capital gains, which
increase the effective rate on returns to corporate
equity. However, three-quarters of corporate
equity is owned by those who do not pay taxes on
dividends, whether because they are owned
through charities, pensions, or other tax-preferred
savings accounts like section 401(k) plans or IRAs,
or pay minimal taxes like foreign owners.109 This
reduces the importance of these shareholder-level
taxes in roughly equalizing the treatment of labor
and corporate equities.
V. Conclusion
Policymakers have overwhelmingly focused
on how international competition means that the
United States should lower its corporate tax rates.
In this report, we have tried to add some balance
to the debate, arguing that this conclusion is far
from obvious and, in fact, that important factors
point in the opposite direction — toward higher
rates. We note a major tension at the heart of
recent corporate tax policy: Policy and economic
changes have made the tax more efficient, and
further changes that we discuss could make it
more so. All else equal, that efficiency justifies a
higher rate, yet the rate has instead decreased
considerably. At the same time, the increase of
rents in the American economy further justifies
higher rates. We cannot say what the optimal rate
is; in particular, there are major unresolved issues

109

Steven M. Rosenthal and Lydia S. Austin, “The Dwindling Taxable
Share of U.S. Corporate Stock,” Tax Notes, May 16, 2016, p. 923. We put
aside here a longer discussion of what would be the appropriate
treatment of corporate income at the personal level.
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with international competition. We can say that
recent legal and economic changes, the rise of
rents, and our proposed tweaks suggest that the
rate should be higher than the current policy
discussion suggests.
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